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Abstract 
The last financial crises have revealed the vulnerability of many emerging countries. Yet, 
within an economically integrated area, some groups of countries have been spared the 
disastrous consequences of these crises. The purpose of this article is to underline the 
similarities between these countries in order to draw up a set of regional criteria that would 
protect an area against speculative attacks. Using a probit analysis, we show that the 
convergence of some banking and financial indicators towards reference levels guarantees the 
confidence of international lenders, which in turn limits financial contagion. A narrow margin 
between the amount of external debt, in particular the short term debt of the country and a 
reference level constitutes a protection against the risk of illiquidity. Similarly, a low domestic 
credit in comparison with the international reserves of the economy is also an indicator of the 
sustainability of an area for international lenders. It is these factors that have ensured the stock 
exchange stability that some emerging areas have enjoyed during the different crisis episodes. 
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1. Introduction 
Several financial crises occurred in emerging markets during the nineties. These crises forced 
them to abandon their fixed or intermediate exchange rate and let their currency float. One of 
the main characteristics of these crises is their chronological and geographic concentration:  
each of them first spread in the region where it was born, crossed the borders and sometimes 
infected more distant regions. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) distinguish two types of 
dynamics: on the one hand, the “Fast and Furious” episodes of contagion, which followed the 
Mexican (1994), Thai (1997) and Russian (1998) crises and, on the other hand, those with 
limited external consequences (Brazil (1999), Turkey (2001), Argentina (2001)). The 
propagation channels of these crises can be real or financial and depend on the relations 
between the country where the crisis was born and the infected country. There is a great deal 
of economic literature on this subject. The main problem met concerns the definition of 
contagion depending on whether it is the fundamental or the purely psychological aspect 
(Masson (1998)) that is being considered. This study deals with fundamental contagion 
(Dornbusch Park and Claessens (2000)), with reference to non-crisis-contingent theories 
(Forbes and Rigobon (2000)) because it explains the regional character of these crises. 
Consequently, different transmission channels resulting from the interdependence among 
markets have to be considered: the real channel through trade links between countries (Glick 
and Rose (1999)), the financial channel which includes both banking exchanges between the 
countries, taking into consideration the role of the common creditor (Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (1999), Caramazza Ricci Salgado (2000)), and the variations in financial assets 
following portfolio reallocations by international investors in countries with the same 
macroeconomic profile as the first country hit by crisis (Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1998), 
Schinasi and Smith (1999), Calvo (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Kodres and Pritsker 
(2002)). 
 Some of the countries that have experienced contagion spillovers have simultaneously 
engaged in processes of regional integration, for example in Latin America (Mercosur), Asia 
(Asean) and Eastern Europe (Cefta). Today these areas have reached the third stage of the 
Balassa (1961) classification: the common market. Therefore, it is extremely interesting to 
analyse the possible interactions between these two phenomena in order to determine a set of 
regional criteria that could constitute collective protection against crisis.  
 
Many studies have tried to explain the spread of crises across countries by regressive models 
like probit/logit. They have considered real and financial bilateral relation between the first 
country hit by the crisis and every infected country, and other control variables – considered 
only during the year preceding the crisis – in order to determine the macroeconomic 
similarities between countries hit by this crisis (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Glick 
and Rose (1999), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999)). In most cases, macroeconomic 
similarities seem to have played a minor part in crisis propagation. To improve these analyses, 
we are going, on the one hand, to compare the evolution of the indicators over the four years 
preceding the crisis from a regional point of view and, on the other hand, to concentrate on the 
role played by the banking and financial structures of the countries and their illiquidity risk in 
the spread of crisis. It is clear that real contagion phenomena are difficult to avoid. 
Nevertheless, the financial and banking sectors offer the possibility of using regional 
protection mechanisms against crises. 
 
We study the contagion phenomenon in each commercial area during the different crises since 
the Mexican episode. Firstly, national indicators are used. Secondly, the problem is 
considered on a regional level. We conclude that if some countries were not infected, it is 
because they were aligned and because their main aggregates converge to a level, which 
international banks and investors take as a reference.  
A second section deals with the choice of the criteria used in our analysis and with the 
presentation of the method. In a third section the results obtained are analysed before 
concluding. 
 
2. An empirical study 
 
2.1. Probit analysis 
 
A probit analysis has been selected. This method seems to be well suited to determining the 
influence of independent variables on a dependent variable
1
:   
yi* = ß’xi + εi  ,  i = 1…,                                                                                                       (1)                
yi = 1  if yi* > 0,  0 if not and  εi  ~  (0,1)                                                                               
y* represents the unobservable variable, y the observed one that takes the value 1 or 0, x is the 
vector of the explanatory variables and ß’ the vector of the coefficients to be estimated.  
The probability yi = 1 can be expressed as the function:  
 P(yi = 1) = P(yi* >0) = F(β’xi)                                                                                                (2) 
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The model is estimated using 
the maximum likelihood method. 
 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 18 countries. All of them come from three distinct 
emerging and economically integrated areas: 6 Mercosur countries
2
, 6 Asian countries
3
 and 6 
                                                 
1
 Specific effects have not been taken into consideration because the hypothesis that enables us to consider the 
random effect probit model is not respected (the rho = 0 hypothesis is not rejected). 
2
 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
3
 Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
Cefta countries
4
. Different periods are considered, depending on the four crisis stages that we 
have chosen. These are the four years preceding a crisis (with monthly data), that is to say: 
from 1990M12 to 1994M12, and from 1997M12 to 2001M12 for Latin America, from 
1993M7 to 1997M7 for Asia and finally from 1997M2 to 2001M2 for Eastern Europe.  
 
Our first series of tests considers the level of each country’s macroeconomic, financial and 
banking variable during the year preceding each period of crisis. The purpose is twofold: first, 
to identify the main channels of contagion that played a part during the period considered, 
afterwards, to see if similarities exist between the countries hit by contagion.  
We then carry out new tests in order to define a group of regional criteria that protect the area 
against contagion. At a regional level, the countries are grouped into two distinct blocks.  
Finally, all the data are pooled together in a single test in order to underline the most 
significant characteristics of the region spared by contagion. 
 
2.2. The choice of criteria 
 
The dependent variable  
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish, for each episode of crisis, the countries that have 
experienced the crisis and those that have not. We use a crisis index based on that proposed 
by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), (1999):   
ReI
R
e ∆−∆= %%
σ
σ
                                                                                                              (3)                                   
The two variables chosen are the rate of change in percent of the real exchange rate (%∆e), in 
order to avoid the inflation problem, and the rate of change in the amount of international 
reserves (%∆R) in the economy. σe and σR represent the standard deviation of these variables. 
                                                 
4
 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
They are based on data covering the three years preceding the crisis. The index taken into 
account is therefore a weighted average of the two rates of change, which have equal 
volatility. We consider that the country suffers from a crisis when the index is superior or 
equal to three standard deviations above the mean. This binary variable, which takes the value 
1 (if the country is hit by crisis) or 0 (if not), corresponds to the dependent variable of the 
probit model. It is called contagion. The results are presented in table 1, table 2 and table 3 
divided into period of crisis and region. 
 
Table1 List of Mercosur countries hit by Latin American crises    
Table 2 List of Asean countries hit by the Thai crisis                                           
Table 3 List of Cefta countries hit by the Turkish crisis 
 
This index of speculative pressure has been chosen because of the availability of data. 
However, when the standard deviation of stock market and bond market indicators
5
 are 
considered, we notice a peak in volatility in the countries identified previously as 1 in the 
same period (appendix A). Therefore results are similar whatever definition of crisis is used. 
The strength of the contagion phenomenon differs in each crisis episode. Whereas the Thai 
crisis (1997) had harmful effects on all the countries of the region, the Turkish crisis (2001) 
did not spread abroad
6
. As for Latin America, the crises only affected certain countries in the 
area
7
. On this point, our results are close to those of Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003).  
 
 
                                                 
5
 These indicators correspond respectively to MSCI price index in US Dollars and to JPM EMBI global returns 
in US Dollars. 
6
 It can be noticed that on the bond market the effects of the Thai crisis on the Asian countries are observed 
several month later.  
7
 It can be noticed that Brazil was particularly vulnerable to the Thai crisis in 1997. This was at the origin of the 
devaluation of the Real in January 1999. However, as own study is limited to a regional analysis, Brazil is not 
taken into account in the sample of Asian countries considered before the Thai crisis.   
Transmission channels 
For each period of instability, we determine which of the three fundamental channels played a 
role in the spread of the crisis. At the end of these tests, the results are compared with the ones 
determined in previous studies.   
 
As for the commercial channel, the study is based on a global trade index similar to that of 
Glick and Rose (1999). This first variable is Trade. The amount of bilateral trade between the 
first country hit by the crisis and each country in the same area is considered. The first 
country in each episode of contagion has been determined by the crisis index: Mexico in 
December 1994, Thailand in July 1997, Turkey in February 2001 and Argentina in December 
2001. The importance of bilateral trade between the countries is measured by calculating the 
weight of exports and imports between the first country and each of its trade partners 
compared to the first country’s total of exports and imports.  
 
Secondly, we assess the importance of the common creditor in the transmission of the crisis 
for the different episodes of contagion. This second variable is Comcred. In the case of 
Mexico, Argentina and other Latin American countries, the principal creditor is the United 
States. Japan is the main lender for Thailand and the Asian countries and Western European 
banks are the first lenders for Turkey and Eastern European countries. The financial market 
links between the first country’s banks and its principal international creditor, and between 
each country of the area and the same creditor are compared in order to see if banking loans 
cause contagion. We use Van Rijckeghem and Weder’s (1999), (2000, pp.10-11) method 
which consists in measuring, on the one hand, the share in total borrowing of each debtor 
country compared to the loans of the first country from the same lender and, on the other 
hand, the importance of each country compared to that of the first country in the total credit of 
this bank. Thus, we have an indicator of the extent to which countries in the same area 
compete for funding from the same international bank.  
 
Thirdly, the purpose is to shed light on the role of international investors in financial markets 
during periods of crisis. In order to create a regional indicator we follow the postulate of 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1998), Schinasi and Smith (1999), Calvo (1999), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) Kodres and Pritsker (2002), who assert that when a crisis occurs in an 
emerging country, international investors reallocate their portfolio of assets to reduce their 
risks. In order to curb the loss of capital, investors sell their assets on markets likely to be 
affected by the crisis, that is to say the markets that fluctuate like the first country hit by the 
crisis (Calvo and Reinhart (1998)).  
First, the stock exchange volatility of each country is measured with regard to the standard 
deviation of their stock exchange index during the period preceding the crisis
8
. If the countries 
hit by the crisis are those that experience a lot of financial instability, we can deduce that 
financial contagion has played a role during the crisis episode considered (Vol). 
In order to underline a regional aspect of this phenomenon, we compare the volatility of the 
financial market in the countries that have been hit by the crisis with those that have been 
spared. Then, a composite indicator of emerging markets’ stock exchanges for each block of 
countries is created and the standard deviation enabling us to show the volatility of each one 
is calculated (Vol_rg). The stock exchange indexes are the same as those previously 
mentioned. They are all calculated using the same method, which considers an aggregate 
market capitalization of 70-80% of the total capitalization of all domestic shares. The data of 
each period are linked by the Paasche chain method, and the period of reference is December 
1994. To work out indicators for each group of countries and each period of crisis, we 
                                                 
8
 The stock exchange index used is drawn from the Standard and Poor database concerning emerging markets 
and corresponds to the S&P/IFCG index. 
calculate the average of these indicators, weighted by the financial importance
9
 of the country 
in the block to which it belongs. Therefore, important fluctuations in the regions hit by the 
crisis show the role of international investors’ behaviour in the spread of crisis
10
. 
 
From national to regional criteria. 
Firstly, for each crisis episode, we determine the main weaknesses responsible for the 
vulnerability of each country to financial contagion. Then, we underline some similarities 
concerning the macroeconomic and financial profile of the countries hit by crisis in the same 
area during the year preceding the crisis. The dependent variable takes the value 1 or 0 
whether the country has undergone the crisis or not
11
. 
 
Secondly, each region analysed is divided into two blocks: one made up of countries spared 
by the crisis (block 0), the other of countries affected by contagion (block 1). The distribution 
between the two blocks is stable. The purpose is to show the evolution, during the four years 
before the crisis, of the margin between the situation of countries that have not been hit by 
crisis and a reference level. A cross-section convergence test, sigma-convergence, is selected. 
This seems to be the most appropriate method for showing both the convergence of indicators 
between different countries and their evolution towards an exogenous norm (Fuss (1999)). 
Sigma-convergence is based on an indicator of dispersion. When there is convergence, the 
indicator decreases.  
2
__
1
, )()( t
I
i
tii
i
XXXVar −=∑
=
η   with  t=1, …, 49.                                                                         (4) 
                                                 
9
 This indication is given by Standard and Poor. 
10
 It is to be noticed that our work is limited by the availability of data concerning stock exchange markets, 
especially in the Mercosur for Paraguay and Uruguay. Moreover, the periodicity of the data (monthly reports) 
provides a synthetic indicator open to criticism. 
 
11
 It is to be noticed that Brazil is considered as belonging to block 1 during the period 1997M12, 1999M12 then 
to block 0 during the period 2000M1, 2001M12 because of the crisis of the Real in January 1999. It is an 
exception, as it is the only country that has been part of both blocks during a same period. 
iη  is the weighted coefficient attributed to country i according to its importance in the cluster 
0 or 1
12
. 
__
, tti XX −  is the differential observed between each country and the reference
13
. The 
standard deviation corresponds to the square root of the variance. These regional variables are 
marked _reg in table 4. 
 
 
For each indicator the reference chosen is the macroeconomic and financial situation of the 
United States, Japan, and Western Europe, weighted by their importance as a common 
creditor in each area during each period. Our choice is justified by the fact that emerging 
countries are strongly dependent on their creditors and therefore on macroeconomic and 
financial fluctuations of the latter. Moreover an indicator that fluctuates according to 
international events is more appropriate than a fixed standard. 
 
We select 9 criteria presented in table 4. The sign in brackets corresponds to the expected 
relation between contagion probability and each independent variable. It is to be noticed that 
in our study a low level of the budgetary and the current account national indicators reveals a 
large deficit. Moreover, there is no collinearity between each variable but, because of the 
proximity of the external debt and illiquidity risk indicators, they are considered in two 
distinct regressions so as to avoid this collinearity problem.  
 
Table 4. List of explanatory variables 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 It corresponds to the weight of the Gross domestic product of the country compared to the total Gross 
domestic product of the block. 
13
 When the level of the domestic variable is higher than the level of the reference, the gap between the two 
variables is regarded as null.  
3. The results 
Even if the results based on national and regional criteria are close, some differences do exist. 
It can be noticed in some cases that an indicator is significant at the national level but not at 
the regional level. We can conclude that it is not the level of the indicator which influences 
the dependent variable, but the margin between the level of the variable and a level of 
reference beyond which the situation of the country or the region is judged unsustainable. So 
it is important to take into consideration the fact that a common reference exists for each 
indicator. Below this reference the risk of loss in international lenders’ confidence increases. 
In an economically integrated region where a crisis occurs, the difference between the 
countries that are hit by financial contagion and the ones that are protected from the crisis 
depends on their propensity to withdraw from, or to converge towards the reference level used 
by international lenders to evaluate the sustainability of a country or an area.  
Moreover, it can be noticed that the regional indicator is more precise because it takes into 
account the economic weight of the country within a region, which reflects its relative 
importance for international lenders. 
 
Table 5. Results of the probit analysis with national indicators 
 
             
Table 6. Results of the probit analysis with regional indicators 
 
 
Our study based on the Mexican crisis period suffers from the lack of stock exchange data 
(Table 5 and 6). However, the results reveal considerable sensitivity of countries to real 
contagion through bilateral trade. Our results are close to those of Glick and Rose (1998). 
Moreover, as emphasised by these authors, there is no significant influence from financial and 
macroeconomic variables. Indeed, our analysis does not reveal an increased deterioration of 
certain indicators in the blocks of countries affected by the Mexican crisis. The only 
difference between the two blocks is the gap between the interest rate of the countries hit by 
crisis and a reference level. This can be explained by the fact that interest rates were very high 
in Brazil at the beginning of the last decade in order to limit inflation. Nevertheless, there was 
no financial contagion through the channel of the common creditor. This result can be 
justified by the fact that no significant disparities in financial and banking indicators appear. 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) explain the limited influence of the common creditor 
during the Mexican crisis by the low impact of the crisis on bank lenders. Indeed, financial 
liberalisation did not influence the spread of the crisis because the countries most hit were 
those least open to foreign capital. This situation can be explained by the fact that Chile, 
which belongs to block 0, opened its capital account before the other countries of the area 
which at the beginning of the nineties were just starting their liberalisation.  
Finally, the most economically integrated countries are the most vulnerable to the spread of 
the crisis. Indeed, trade between Argentina and Brazil - which belong to block 1 - is very 
developed because of their economic weight in the area and because they have had 
commercial agreements since the seventies. 
 
During the period preceding the Argentina crisis the countries that had been hit by the 
consequences of this shock suffered from a lot of financial instability aggravated by the 
Brazilian crisis (table 5 and 6). Among these were Paraguay and Brazil (at the beginning of 
the period). They experienced had a very high interest rate, which increased budgetary deficit. 
Moreover, their external debt, in particular short-term debt, worsened. However, their 
influence is relative because of the light weight of Paraguay in comparison to Brazil and 
Argentina within the block. In addition, when the crisis occurred, these countries, which had 
suffered from a lack in international creditors’ confidence, saw the share of foreign capital 
decrease significantly, and consequently greater volatility of their stock exchange. Besides, 
during this period Argentina, which had been weakened by the Brazilian crisis, suffered from 
important pressure on its exchange rate. Therefore, in order to maintain the currency board, it 
had to increase its foreign debt. Its trade partners’ devaluation contributed to an aggravation 
of the situation. Finally, after the disturbances that destabilized the area Uruguay, with the 
help of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, tried to maintain its crawling 
peg, which generated an important increase in its external debt and its budgetary deficit.  
Thus, this phenomenon caused a great deal of financial contagion. Our national and regional 
indicators show a lot of financial fragility which is at the origin of the loss of international 
banks’ and investors’ confidence as shown by significant financial contagion indicators. A 
high budgetary deficit in these countries aggravated by a lack of liquidity and a substantial 
debt reveals a risk of unsustainability. This important unbalance and significant financial 
volatility seem to be the main indicators that international lenders use to assess the risk of  
crisis in the area. Indeed, the block of countries that were spared by the crisis had taken 
advantage of a convergence of their financial and banking indicators towards a sustainable 
level for international investors which began after the Brazilian crisis (appendix C). A low 
influence of the financial liberalisation indicator can be noticed. This is explained by the fact 
that the countries most hit by the crisis were not those whose assets and liabilities stocks were 
the highest because, after the Brazilian crisis, the area suffered from considerable capital 
outflows.    
Finally, there was real contagion because of the weight of trade between Argentina and Brazil 
before the Real devaluation. This phenomenon does not seem to be linked to greater regional 
economic integration between block 0 countries. Our results concerning this indicator vary. 
Therefore, we cannot draw any conclusion regarding the importance of this variable. 
 In order to underline the weaknesses of the Southeast Asian countries before the Thai crisis, 
we have chosen to compare this block of countries to the group made up of the East European 
countries that were spared the harmful consequences of the Turkish crisis (table 5 and 6). Our 
results reveal contagion generated by bilateral trade, by the common creditor and by stock 
exchange volatility at the same time. So our conclusions are in agreement with those of Glick 
and Rose (1998) concerning the importance of the international trade channel, with those of 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) on the same point and also concerning the common 
creditor, and those of Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000). According to the latter, a lot of 
stock exchange volatility represents a risk for international investors, which generated 
financial contagion during the Asian crisis. The spread of the crisis was caused by the 
deterioration of the banking and financial situations of countries of the area although the 
macroeconomic environment was sustainable. Indeed, in the period preceding the crisis, 
Southeast Asian countries had low budgetary and current deficits. Moreover, the interest rates 
of these countries were low in comparison to the level of reference and to the level of the East 
European countries that hoped to join the European Union.  
On the other hand, the situation of the banking and financial sectors in the Asian countries 
worsened during the same period
14
. The large decrease in banking liquidities reflects a credit 
“boom”. Short-term debt rose, increasing the total amount of external debt. The consequence 
was a decline in international creditors’ confidence which was at the origin of higher stock 
exchange volatility. The level of financial integration in Asian countries was very high. This 
early capital account openness was at the origin of excessive risk-taking which is shown by 
the banking and financial indicators’ deterioration during the four years preceding the Thai 
crisis.  
                                                 
14
 It can be noticed that the over large margin concerning the indicator credrisk_rg between the level of the 
variable of block 1 compared to block 0 (the dispersion of block 1 is greater than those of block 0) prevents us 
integrating this indicator in our regional probit analysis. 
Finally, we cannot draw any conclusion regarding the link between economic integration and 
contagion. Indeed, the two areas seem to have the same level of regional integration.  
 
In order to have a global vision of emerging areas spared by financial crisis, the indicators 
corresponding to each crisis episode are pooled (table 5 and 6). It can be noticed that the study 
based on national criteria and that based on regional criteria often display similar results 
regarding the main weaknesses that create financial contagion. With respect to the regional 
criteria – because of their precision and their explanatory power – we can conclude that it is 
not the deterioration of macroeconomic indicators that generates financial contagion but the 
weakness of the financial and banking sectors. Indeed, the most vulnerable areas have 
moderate current and budgetary deficits compared to the industrial countries that are taken as 
a reference. Moreover, the margin between inflation and interest rates in these countries and 
the reference level is slight. Consequently our results converge with those of empirical 
literature which show that macroeconomic similarities play a minor role in the spread of 
crisis. On the other hand, we can conclude that financial and banking fragility creates 
financial contagion. Countries are vulnerable to the international lenders’ opinion when the 
illiquidity risk of their banking sector is high and their external debt, particularly their short-
term debt, is heavy. This situation can be explained by the fact that in many emerging 
countries financial liberalisation was too rapid and not sufficiently controlled to limit risk-
taking behaviour. It gave rise to a weakening of the countries banking and financial 
institutions which were not ready to receive such a large amount of foreign capital.   
Even if the commercial channel is significant in the spread of crisis, the respect of certain 
regional criteria would guarantee the protection of emerging areas against the harmful 
consequences of these crises. Besides, we have seen that it is not the most economically 
integrated countries which are the most affected by contagion. This leads us to conclude that 
even if there is a contagion effect through bilateral trade between the first country and its 
main partners, the latter do not reproduce this effect. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We cannot ignore the fact that the spread of financial crisis through bilateral trade between the 
first country hit by the crisis and its main commercial partners exists, and that it is difficult to 
contain. However, protection against financial contagion at a regional level is conceivable. 
The purpose of our study is to shed light on a group of regional criteria whose respect would 
guarantee the stability of emerging areas, especially during periods of crisis. The comparison 
of the results of the two analyses with national and regional criteria enables us to emphasise 
the need to take into account financial and banking regional indicators.  
Indeed, convergence of external debt to a reference level – partly due to a limited short-term 
debt compared to the amount of international reserves in the economy – indicates that the 
country’s financial sector is sustainable. Moreover a use of domestic credit, which does not 
exceed the amount of available liquidities, is necessary for the good health of the banking 
sector. These criteria guarantee international lenders’ confidence thereby limiting the 
volatility of the stock exchange and thus financial contagion.  
Finally, our results do not allow us to assimilate contagion phenomenon and regionalism. 
Therefore, rather than economic integration being mainly responsible for the spread of crisis, 
it is the lack of convergence of banking and financial indicators between countries towards a 
stable reference level that prevents the sustainability of the area. 
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Appendix A. Measures of financial crisis based on stock market and bond market volatility in 
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Appendix C. Sigma-convergence of significant regional variables corresponding to areas  
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 Table 1. List of Mercosur countries hit by Latin American crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. List of Asean countries hit by the Thai crisis       Table 3. List of Cefta countries hit by the Turkish crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries  
 
Mexican 
crisis 
 
 
Brazilian 
crisis 
 
Argentina 
crisis 
Argentina 1 0 1 
Bolivia 0 0 0 
Brazil 1 1 0 
Chile 0 0 0 
Mexico 1 0 0 
Paraguay 0 1 1 
Uruguay 0 0 1 
 
Countries  
 
Asian 
crisis 
Indonesia 1 
Korea 1 
Malaysia 1 
Philippines 1 
Singapore 1 
Thailand 1 
 
Countries 
 
 
Turkish 
crisis 
Bulgaria 0 
Czech 
Republic 
 
0 
Hungary 0 
Poland 0 
Slovakia  0 
Slovenia 0 
Turkey 1 
Table 4. List of explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Expected sign Role of the variable 
 
Inflation rates 
 
Rate of change in percent of 
the consumer prices 
 
Inf  (+) 
Inf_rg (+) 
 
A low inflation differential shows a homogeneous preference in the economic policies of an area that can attract 
investors and banks (Kindleberger (1986)). 
 
 
Interest rates 
 
Monetary market rate 
 
Intrte (+) 
Intrte_rg (+) 
 
This indicator shows the mobility of the capital between countries that helps to resorb the negative effects of an 
asymmetric shock (Ingram (1969)). The weakness of this indicator points to a high degree of international integration. 
 
 
 
Budgetary 
policy 
 
 
Budgetary deficit in percent of 
GDP 
 
 
Budg (-) 
Budg_rg (+) 
 
According the Maastricht criteria (Pisani-Ferry (2002)), a convergence of the budgetary policies towards a common 
reference is important for the sustainability of the Euro area. Both national taxes and international markets can finance 
an overlarge budgetary deficit. This deficit may grow in the long run and raise the external debt. This instability may 
then generate a loss in investors’ confidence that withdraw their capital from the area (Moreno (1995)).  
 
 
 
 
Credit risk 
 
 
 
Ratio of private sector credits 
to banking deposits 
 
 
 
Credrisk (+) 
Credrisk_rg(+) 
In the third generation of crisis models, some authors (Chang and Velasco (2000), (2001), Mishkin (1999)) show 
that the high vulnerability of countries to speculative attacks during the last decade was due to banking weakness. 
So, the significant weight of the banking sector in emerging countries and the excessive risk-taking in this sector 
have generated a credit “boom” just before recent financial crises.  
A high level of this indicator reveals a large risk that can induce a loss in the confidence of international banks, which 
are the main creditors of the commercial banks in emerging countries. 
 
 
External debt 
 
External debt in percent of 
GDP 
 
Debt (+) 
Debt_rg (+) 
 
Exchange rate literature has stressed the fact that the emerging countries that had a large external debt were hit by 
financial crisis (Krugman (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini (1998), (1999)). 
 
 
Illiquidity 
risk 
 
Ratio of short-term external 
debt to international reserves 
 
 
Liq (+) 
Liq_rg (+) 
 
According to economic literature (Furman and Stiglitz (1998)), just before the crisis countries experienced an important 
risk of illiquidity, which was at the origin of the loss of investors’ confidence. 
 
Current 
account 
balance 
 
 
Current account deficit in 
percent of GDP 
 
CA (-) 
CA_rg (+) 
 
The current deficit shows the bad financial situation of a country compared with the rest of the world. It corresponds to 
a need for capital. This situation can generate a decrease of international reserves and an increase of the external debt if 
it is not reduced through long-term capital inflows. This can lead to an unsustainable risk. 
 
 
 
Economic 
integration  
 
Ratio of bilateral trade in the 
same block weighted by the 
importance of each country to 
the amount of trade with the 
rest of the world 
 
 
 
Int (- /+) 
 
The aim here is to determine if regional economic integration can be a criterion for protection against crisis, as shown 
by Frankel (1996), or if it generates contagion because of trade links.  
The more important the ratio is, the higher the importance given to regional commercial partners will be. 
 
Financial 
integration 
 
Sum of the stock portfolio 
equity and the stock of direct 
investment assets and 
liabilities to GDP 
 
 
 
Fiint (+) 
 
 
A volume based measure of international financial integration has been chosen from the global indicator and data 
proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The emerging countries’ rapid financial liberalisation and the large inflow 
of volatile capital seem to have increased banks’ illiquidity risks and their vulnerability to external shock and changes 
in the expectations of international investors (Chang and Velasco (2000), Edwards (2000)). 
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Table 5  
Results of the probit analysis with national indicators 
 
Values in brackets represent the z significance level of the coefficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mexican crisis Argentina crisis Asian and Turkish crisis Global 
 
Inf 
 
 
Intrte 
 
 
Budg 
 
 
Credrisk 
 
 
CA 
 
 
Fiint 
 
 
Liq 
 
 
Debt 
 
 
Trade 
 
 
Comcred 
 
 
Vol 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
-.023   -.10 
(-.06)  (-.31) 
 
.048     .050 
(2.27) (2.28) 
 
-.004   -.004 
(-.95)(-1.01) 
 
.028     .023 
(0.65) (0.50) 
 
.079     .054 
 (.74)   (.50) 
 
 -22.6  -18.8 
(-2.2)(-2.12) 
 
.112 
(1.33) 
 
           .049 
          (0.72) 
 
 3.39    3.48 
(4.47) (4.21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -2.27   -2.66 
(-2.07)(-2.4) 
 
 
-.105  -.055 
(-1.7)(-0.91) 
 
.005    .007 
(1.65)(1.69) 
 
-.005 -.005 
(-1.6)(-1.72) 
 
-.032   -.042 
(-1.5)(-1.89) 
 
.018    .007 
(0.88) (0.42) 
 
-7.11  -5.32   
(-4.3)(-3.94) 
 
.078 
(4.08) 
 
           .044 
          (1.90) 
 
 
 
 
-.008   -.013  
(-0.97)(-1.5) 
 
 
 
 
 .45      .628  
(1.36) (1.98) 
 
 
-.162  -.618 
(-.53)(-1.69) 
 
.169     .239 
(4.96) (4.98) 
 
-.009  -.051 
(-.11)(-.64) 
 
-.149  -.232 
(-2.83)(-3.3) 
 
.384    .412 
(3.12)(2.96) 
 
-15.0 -15.75 
(-5.7)(-5.59) 
 
 .065 
(1.06) 
 
            .375 
           (3.25) 
 
.104    .159  
(2.76) (3.79) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.41    -.301  
(4.84)(-0.20) 
 
 
-.660   -1.41 
(-2.77)(-3.8) 
 
 .104    .191 
(3.87)(4.60) 
 
-.173  -.198 
(-2.3)(-2.75) 
 
-.139  .002 
(-3.39)(0.06) 
 
 .239  .333 
(2.50)(2.85) 
 
-9.31 -12.36 
(-5.3)(-4.86) 
 
.173 
(4.35) 
 
            .544 
           (5.81) 
 
 
 
 
6.386 17.62 
(1.96) (4.75) 
 
 
 
 
-.032   -11.1 
(-.02)(-4.63) 
 
-1.16  -2.00 
(-3.32)(-3.6) 
 
.102    .211 
(3.54)(4.34) 
 
-.153  -.170 
(-2.05)(-1.9) 
 
-.091   .084 
(-1.86)(1.18) 
 
.109     .284 
(.90)  (1.67) 
 
-1.63  -6.80 
(-.69)(-2.23) 
 
.205 
(3.75) 
 
            .619 
          (4.70) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.012   .013 
(2.76)(2.20) 
 
-2.22  -8.41 
(-1.4)(-3.24) 
 
.448     .462 
(2.46) (2.73) 
 
-.084   -.088 
(-3.3)(-3.69) 
 
.068     .063  
(3.52) (3.47) 
 
.298     .270 
(7.13)(6.83) 
 
 .045     .016 
(1.45)   (.57) 
 
.056   .068 
(.09)   (.11) 
 
.151 
(5.60) 
 
             .004 
            (.20) 
 
.559     .507 
(5.74) (5.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.82    -2.03 
(-7.28)(-5.8) 
 
.168     .375 
(.78)  (1.77) 
 
-.144   -.080  
(-4.97)(-2.5) 
 
.091    .105 
(4.18) (4.05) 
 
.562   .596 
(8.39) (7.47) 
 
-.011   -.080  
(-.3) (-2.07) 
 
3.06   5.42 
(4.59)(5.25) 
 
.100 
(3.39) 
 
            -.21 
         (-1.11) 
 
 
 
 
12.9 
(5.94) 
 
 
 
 
-9.18  -10.63  
(-7.22)(-7.4) 
 
.171    .147 
(.61)   (.70) 
 
-.154   -.160 
(-4.27)(-5.3) 
 
.036    .039 
(1.60) (1.86) 
 
.212    .140 
(3.18) (2.46) 
 
.045   -.002 
(1.03)(-0.07) 
 
.407     .407 
(.58)    (.59) 
 
.297 
(3.77) 
 
             .005 
             (.21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.006     .006  
(2.49) (2.74) 
 
-1.38  -.310 
(-2.76)(-.74) 
 
 
.095   .102 
(1.72)(2.27) 
 
.0002  .0001  
(0.35)(0.44) 
 
.089    .068 
(4.50)(3.66) 
 
.031   .019 
(3.52)(2.22) 
 
.034   .030 
(1.76)(1.56) 
 
.955   .833  
(3.52)(2.92) 
 
.106  
(8.63) 
 
           .008 
          (0.78) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.001      .001 
(2.16) (.001) 
 
-1.14    -.408 
(-6.14)(-2.3) 
 
Obs 
 
Log 
Likelihood 
 
Prob > 
Chi2 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
 
294     294 
 
 
-12.8  13.47 
 
 
0.00   0.00 
 
0.93   0.93 
   
294   294  
 
 
-103.3-113.3 
 
 
0.00   0.00 
 
0.45   0.40 
 
245      245 
 
 
-41.2 -35.45 
 
 
0.00    0.00 
 
0.75    0.79 
 
294      294 
 
 
-59.7 -41.15  
 
 
0.00    0.00 
 
0.70    0.79 
 
148     148  
 
 
-45.91 -30.6 
 
 
0.00   0.00 
 
0.55   0.70 
  
478      478 
 
 
-99.9 -119.4 
 
 
0.00    0.00 
 
0.70   0.64 
 
490     490  
 
 
-89.16 -82.6  
 
 
 0.00  0.00 
 
 0.73  0.75 
 
304      304  
 
 
-65.77 -89.5 
 
 
0.00    0.00 
 
0.65    0.53 
  
 598     598   
 
 
-284.9-231.6 
 
 
0.00      0.00 
 
0.28     0.16  
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Table 6  
Results of the probit analysis with regional indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
           
Values in brackets represent the z significance level of the coefficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexican crisis 
 
Argentina crisis 
Asian and Turkish 
crisis 
 
Global 
 
Inf_Rg 
 
 
Intrte_Rg 
 
 
Budg_Rg 
 
 
Credrisk_Rg 
 
 
Ca_Rg 
 
 
Liq_Reg 
 
 
Debt_Rg 
 
 
Int-Reg 
 
 
Vol 
 
 
Constant 
 
      .131        .027 
     (0.44)      (0.10) 
 
      .053        .062 
     (1.76)     (2.15) 
 
     -.803       2.15 
    (-1.53)   (-1.66) 
 
    -.017       .018 
   (-0.14)    (0.16) 
  
     .200       .195 
   (0.80)     (0.77) 
 
     .096     
   (1.40) 
 
                  .182 
                 (1.59) 
 
   .812        .781 
  (2.63)      (2.65) 
 
 
 
 
   -8.83      -8.84  
  (-2.94)    (-3.13) 
 
    .043          .882  
   (0.07)       (1.55) 
 
    .0006       -.047    
    (0.02)     (-1.54)   
 
     .353         .489  
   (1.90)       (2.14) 
 
    -.077       -.284  
   (-0.36)     (-1.27) 
 
     .157        .144 
    (1.13)      (1.09) 
 
    .436       
   (2.22) 
 
                   .547 
                  (2.95) 
 
    .161        1.02    
   (0.48)      (3.82) 
 
    .017        .012     
  (3.82)       (3.01) 
 
   -6.03       -8.10 
  (-3.14)    (-3.45) 
 
 
 
    2.23          1.50 
   (2.29)       (2.54) 
 
   -.652         -.339 
  (-2.74)      (-2.50) 
 
   -.827         -.431 
  (-3.77)      (-4.36) 
 
 
 
 
   -.386          -.165 
   (-1.94)      (-1.49) 
 
    .671        
    (3.40) 
 
                    .305 
                   (2.59) 
 
   -1.03         -1.25  
  (-1.18)      (-1.59) 
 
    .006           .006 
   (1.61)        (2.20) 
 
     5.19          3.93  
    (2.35)        (2.30) 
 
   .0005          .091 
   (0.01)        (0.90) 
 
   .003            .002 
   (1.51)        (0.88) 
 
    -.126        -.100 
    (-2.13)     (-1.78) 
 
     .084          .087 
     (2.94)       (3.19) 
 
     -.036         -.041 
     (-1.09)     (-1.24) 
 
      .131     
      (4.66) 
 
                       .117 
                      (3.44) 
  
      -.241       -.131 
     (-3.69)     (-2.08) 
 
      .008         .007 
       (5.69)     (5.73) 
 
      -1.22        -1.44  
      (-3.71)    (-3.68) 
 
Obs 
 
Log Likelihood 
 
Prob > Chi2 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
     
    98           98 
 
  -14.93    -14.84 
   0.00        0.00 
 
   0.78        0.78 
 
    98             98 
 
 -28.57        -25.63 
  
   0.00          0.00 
 
   0.58          0.62  
 
  92            92 
 
-18.80     -33.35 
 
0.00         0.00 
 
 0.70          0.48 
 
190           287 
 
-127.03       -133.8 
 
 0.00         0.00 
 
0.36         0.33 
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   Fig. 1. Stock market volatility in Latin America          Fig. 2. Stock market volatility in Eastern Europe 
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Fig. 3. Stock market volatility in Southeast Asia 
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Fig. 4. Bond market volatility in Latin America          Fig. 5. Bond market volatility in Eastern Europe 
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Fig. 6. Bond market volatility in Southeast Asia 
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Table 7. Explanatory variables 
 
Trade 
Imports and Exports between countries, first country total 
Imports and Exports (millions US Dollars) 
 
DOTS 
Comcred 
Countries borrows to principal creditors of the area and 
credits of international banks to countries (millions US 
dollars) 
 
 BIS 
Vol 
Emerging countries stock exchange index (Standard and 
Poors) 
 
 DATASTREAM (S&P/IFCG) 
INF 
Consommation price index 
 
 IFS. Ligne 64.ZF 
INTRTE 
Monetary interest rate 
 
 IFS. Ligne 60B.ZF. 
BUDG 
Budgetary deficit/surplus (millions US Dollars) 
Gross Domestic Product (millions US Dollars) 
 IFS 
 Ligne 80.Z.F. 
 Ligne 99.B. 
 CREDRISK 
 Banking Deposits (millions US Dollars). 
 Credit to private sector (millions national currency). 
 Exchange rate national currency per US Dollar 
 IFS 
 Ligne 7A.DZF 
 Ligne 52.DZF 
 Ligne ae 
 CA 
 Current deficit/surplus (millions of US Dollars) 
 Gross Domestic Product (millions US Dollars) 
 IFS 
 Ligne 78ALDZF. 
 Ligne 99.B. 
 DEBT 
 External debt (millions US Dollars). 
 Gross Domestic Product (millions US Dollars) 
 
 BIS-IMF-OECD-WB Statistics 
(www.bis.org) 
 Ligne 99.B. 
 LIQ 
 Short term debt (millions US Dollars). 
 Total Reserves minus gold (millions US Dollars) 
 
 WB-WDI 
 IFS 1.L.DZF 
INT 
 Imports and exports between countries and Towards the 
rest of    
 the  world (millions US Dollars) 
 
DOTS 
 FIINT 
 Stock of portfolio equity and stock of direct investment 
assets           
and liabilities (in US Dollars) 
 
 P. Lane, G.M. Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
database 
IFS : IMF International Financial Statistics Cd-Rom (2004), 
DOTS : IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Cd-Rom (2005), 
WB-WDI : World Bank World Development Indicators (2003). 
BIS: www.bis.org. 
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Fig. 7. INTRTE (Mexican crisis)
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Fig. 8. BUDG (Argentina crisis)
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Fig. 9. LIQ (Argentina crisis)
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Fig. 10. DEBT (Argentina crisis)
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f ig. 11. CREDRISK (compar ison Asia/ East ern Europe)
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Fig. 12. LIQ (comparison Asia/Eastern Europe)
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Fig. 13. DEBT (comparison Asia/Eastern Europe)
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